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‘‘I Think They Discriminated Against Me’’:
Using Prototype Theory and Organizational
Justice Theory for Understanding Perceived
Discrimination in Selection and
Promotion Situations
Michael M. Harris*
College of Business Administration and
Center for International Studies,
University of Missouri-St. Louis
Filip Lievens and Greet Van Hoye
Ghent University, Belgium
Research in industrial/organizational (I/O) psychology has generally focused on objective
measures of employment discrimination and has virtually neglected individuals’
subjective perceptions as to whether a selection or promotion process is discriminatory
or not. This paper presents two theoretical models as organizing frameworks to explain
candidates’ likelihood of perceiving that discrimination has occurred in a certain selection
or promotion situation. The prototype model stresses the importance of the prototypical
victim-perpetrator combination, the perceived intention of the decision-maker, and the
perceived harm caused as possible antecedents of perceived employment discrimination.
In the organizational justice model, procedural, informational, interpersonal, and
distributive fairness play a central role in determining candidates’ perceptions of
discrimination. The fairness heuristic helps to explain which type of fairness information
dominates these perceptions. Applications and research propositions are discussed as well
as the similarities and differences between the two models. We conclude by offering
several factors that may determine which model is used in deciding whether or not
discrimination has occurred.
Introduction
E mployment discrimination is a major focus of researchin industrial/organizational (I/O) psychology. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was an important impetus for
lawsuits in this area, and subsequent laws (e.g., the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990) have served to
increase litigation. The passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1991 appears to be a key turning point in terms of lawsuits,
with the number of employment lawsuits growing more
than 20 percent annually in the last decade (Sharf & Jones,
1999). From an organization’s viewpoint, class action
lawsuits are of particular concern because of the potential
costs involved. Even if a case is settled out of court, the
costs can run intomillions of dollars (Sharf& Jones, 1999).
As an example, Wal-Mart Corporation was recently sued
for sex discrimination in pay and promotions with a
potential ‘‘class’’ of some 1.5 million members. I/O
psychologists have played a significant role in the employ-
ment discrimination area, particularly with regard to the
development of selection and promotion processes that will
withstand legal scrutiny (e.g., Terpstra, Mohamed, &
Kethley, 1999; Williamson, Campion, Malos, Roehling, &
Campion, 1997). To a lesser degree, I/O psychologists have
served as expert witnesses in the courtroom, testifying
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either for plaintiffs or defendants regarding the legality of
these processes. Accordingly, there exists an impressive
literature in I/O psychology regarding measures of the
discriminatory impact (e.g., the Four-Fifths rule of thumb,
the Fisher exact test, differential prediction) of various
selection and promotion processes. There is also a
relatively small, but rapidly growing, literature addressing
why the tendency for bias and discrimination exists and the
interventions that can reduce this problem (e.g., Brief &
Barsky, 2000; Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). Most
recently, Kunda and Spencer (2003) developed a theory
focusing on the situational factors that determine whether
stereotypes will come to play a role in making various
judgments.
Despite this vast literature addressing the presence and
determinants of discrimination, individuals’ perceptions as
to whether a selection or promotion process is discrimina-
tory or not have been largely ignored by both researchers
and practitioners. This is rather surprising, given that
individuals may have little or no idea as to how a court
might assess discrimination, let alone whether they have
enough information to accurately conclude whether
discrimination has occurred. With few exceptions (e.g.,
Goldman, 2001), there is practically no theory or research
in I/O psychology to help understand perceptions of
discrimination or to compare perceptions of discrimination
to judicial decisions regarding discrimination. Why an
employee or applicant would decide that a negative
selection or promotion decision is due to discrimination
based on his or her race, age, gender, religion or other group
membership, rather than due to the lack of qualifications or
to other reasons (e.g., personal friendship) has rarely been
addressed in I/O psychology.
The topic of perceived discrimination has, however,
been addressed in the social-psychological literature, where
a growing body of studies exists. In a seminal paper, Major,
Quinton, and McCoy (2002) provided a comprehensive
review of perceived discrimination and emphasized areas in
this research that deserve further examination. Their
review focused on prototypes, and related literature, in
understanding perceived discrimination (e.g., Inman &
Baron, 1996; Inman, Huerta, & Oh, 1998). A second
approach, the justice model, was largely ignored in the
Major et al. review. The justice model has its roots in
understanding general fairness and equity issues, with
distributive fairness and procedural fairness being related
to discrimination complaints (Goldman, 2001; Lind,
Greenberg, Scott, & Welchans, 2000). Although initially
grounded in social psychology, in the last two decades, a
plethora of research on organizational justice has been
produced in the domain of I/O psychology which appears
to be relevant to the issue of perceived discrimination
as well.
There are several different possible explanations as to
why an individual may have been rejected for a job opening
or promotion opportunity, including the fact that he or she
was simply not the most qualified candidate or that he or
she was rejected in favor of a personal friend of the hiring
manager. The focus of this paper is what determines
whether an individual perceives that discrimination (based
on his or her race, gender, age, or any number of other
characteristics) was the reason for this rejection. Towards
that end, we contribute to existing research on discrimina-
tion by proposing two different models as organizing
theoretical frameworks to explain people’s likelihood of
perceiving that employment discrimination has occurred
with regard to a selection or promotion decision. There are
several unique aspects to this paper. First, the notion of
perceived discrimination being an important variable of
interest has not been addressed in the I/O psychology
literature. Second, we offer two different models of the
antecedents of perceived discrimination; most of the
literature has focused on just one of these models. Third,
we elaborate and build on these models, contributing new
ideas beyond what has been said to date in the literature
about them.
The remainder of the paper is divided into the following
sections. We first begin with a discussion of the focal
criterion variable, namely, perceived discrimination.
Second, we review the possible antecedents of perceived
discrimination, offering two theoretical models (prototype
model and justice model). Third, we comment briefly on
possible consequences of perceived discrimination. We
conclude with a critical discussion that focuses on the
similarities and differences between the two proposed
models and provide some suggestions as to when and
where a respondent might use one rather than the other
model for determining whether discrimination has oc-
curred.
It is important to note that different people use various
terms associated with our topic quite differently. To avoid
confusion, we use the term ‘‘perceived discrimination’’
throughout the paper to refer to a situation where an
individual believes that he or she has been treated unfairly
because of race, gender, age, or any other such character-
istic. Occasionally, we use the term ‘‘prejudice’’ in a similar
vein. For this paper, an ‘‘unfair decision’’ means a decision
that is believed to have beenmadewithout regard to proper
procedures or is based on irrelevant factors (e.g., friend-
ships). Thus, an unfair decision is not necessarily due to
discrimination.
Focal Criterion: Perceived Discrimination
Most of the prior literature in I/O psychology on
discrimination has examined actual differences in terms
of predictors or outcomes. There is a large literature, for
example, on racial differences on cognitive ability tests
(e.g., Hough, Oswald, & Ployhart, 2001; Schmitt, Clause,
& Pulakos, 1996), integrity tests (e.g., Ones & Viswesvar-
an, 1998), interviews (e.g., Huffcutt, Conway, Roth, &
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Stone, 2001), and performance ratings (e.g., Ford, Kraiger,
& Schechtman, 1986). There is a somewhat smaller body
of research concerning gender differences in pay (e.g.,
Birnbaum, 1985; Gollob, 1984; Harris, Gilbreath, &
Sunday, 2002; McFatter, 1987). The major emphasis in
all of these areas has been on real, rather than perceived,
differences between Blacks and Whites and between men
and women with regard to these measures. It is only in the
area of sexual harassment (e.g., Corr & Jackson, 2001)
that researchers have considered individuals’ perceptions
as to whether or not discrimination has occurred.
While most of our examples focus on race discrimina-
tion, the models presented here potentially apply for any
type of discrimination, including gender, national origin,
and sexual orientation discrimination. An underlying
assumption is that one’s perceptions as to whether a
particular situation reflects discrimination may differ
substantially, depending on a variety of individual and
situational factors. The emphasis in this paper is on the
antecedents of perceived discrimination. That is, we
consider various factors that will lead respondents to
perceive there to be more, or less, discrimination leveled
against the target of the decision (i.e., the candidate). A
better theoretical understanding of perceptions of discri-
mination is important because these perceptions may not
necessarily match with existing objective indices of
discrimination. Moreover, as we will discuss later in this
paper, perceived discrimination may have some important
consequences, so this construct may be relevant for both
theoretical and practical considerations.
Prototype Model
Background
One approach, which has been examined by Inman and her
colleagues (e.g., Inmann, 2001; Inman & Baron, 1996;
Inman et al., 1998), has used the notion of prototypes, or
expectations, in order to understand the determinants of
perceived discrimination. The underlying variable appears
to be the degree to which the decision-maker is perceived to
have violated the norm of social responsibility, which
assumes that powerful individuals should not take advan-
tage of the less powerful (Rodin, Price, Bryson, & Sanchez,
1990). Thus, the greater the degree to which the decision-
maker appears to have violated that norm in treating
someone (e.g., in making a hiring or promotion decision),
the more likely that the decision-maker is perceived to have
discriminated against the target (i.e., the rejected candi-
date). To date, research examining the prototype model has
considered the victim-perpetrator characteristics (i.e., the
demographics of the actors involved), the perceived
intention on the part of the decision-maker, and the
perceived harm to the recipient. The next section reviews
research regarding these variables as well as two individual
(subgroup identity and mood) moderator variables that
may be relevant. A summary of the components of the
prototype model is provided in Figure 1.
Prototype Model
According to the prototype model, perceived discrimina-
tion is determined by how well a particular event or
incident reflects widely held beliefs, expectations, and
norms about (the violation of) social responsibility. Inman
and Baron (1996) suggested that people hold certain
expectancies as to who the perpetrators and victims of
discrimination are, and these expectancies determine
judgments of discrimination. For instance, Inman and her
colleagues found that perpetrators who were expected to
be in a power position (i.e., were historically assumed to
have power in a specific situation) were believed more
likely to be discriminating than perpetrators not expected
to be in a power position (i.e., were not historically
assumed to have power in a specific position). As an
example, imagine that a White manager in a bank rejects a
Black candidate for a job promotion. In such a situation,
the candidate should be relatively likely to assume that the
decision was based on discrimination. Compare that with a
situation where a Black manager in a bank rejects a White
candidate for a job promotion. In that case, the candidate
should be less likely to attribute the decision to discrimina-
tion. The difference, according to prototype theory, is that












Perceived harm caused 
by decision 
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Figure 1. The prototype model of perceived employment discrimination.
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more power than Black managers in the banking industry.
At the same time, Blacks have historically experienced
difficulty in achieving employment success in the banking
industry (it is important to note that tremendous strides
have been made in many occupations by minorities and
that such generalizations will be increasingly difficult to
make now and in the future).
In the present context, however, the rejected candidate
may ultimately find out who was promoted. Thus, it seems
important to consider not only who was rejected, but also
who was accepted for the position. We would expect,
following the present example, that if another Black
candidate was promoted, the rejected candidate would be
less likely to conclude that race discrimination had taken
place; conversely, if a White candidate was promoted, the
rejected candidate would be more likely to conclude that
discrimination had occurred. In short, we expect that when
it is known who received the job offer or promotion
opportunity, the successful candidate’s group membership
will have an important effect on perceptions of discrimina-
tion. If the individual who was hired or promoted is of the
same race as the rejected candidate, then the rejected
candidate would be less likely to conclude that discrimina-
tion had occurred on the basis of race. Of course in that
case, the rejected candidate may conclude that there was
discrimination based on another group category, such as
gender.
It should be also pointed out that a rejected candidate
will not always know who the decision-maker (e.g., hiring
manager) was. In that case, he or she may focus on the
organization or department as a whole. That is, people
generally believe that organizations have a reputation or
image (e.g., Turban & Cable, 2003), which may include a
diversity dimension reflecting prejudice or lack thereof
against various groups (e.g., Mor Barak, Cherin, &
Berkman, 1998). Thus, even in the absence of knowing
who the decision-maker is, a rejected candidate may have a
perception of the organization’s reputation in this regard,
which may in turn be used to determine whether
discrimination has occurred. We also acknowledge
that there may be multiple decision-makers (e.g., a panel
of interviewers) involved in choosing the candidate
for promotion or hire. We would expect that in that case,
the rejected candidate may simply attempt to determine
who was the major responsible party for the negative
decision.
Perceived Harm and Perceived Intention
Swim, Scott, Sechrist, Campbell, and Stangor (2003)
hypothesized that the greater degree to which the
decision-maker was regarded as being intentional in his
or her action, the more discriminatory the action was
perceived to be. Similarly, they hypothesized that the
greater the amount of harm caused by the action, the more
likely that the action would be judged to be discriminatory.
Swim et al. also predicted an interaction between intention
and harm such that harm would have the greatest effect on
perceptions of discrimination when the decision-maker’s
intention is unknown or intention is limited. Conversely,
harm would have the least effect when the decision-maker
is assumed to have intended to discriminate. Swim et al.
found strong support for all three of these hypotheses.
Given the apparent importance of intentions, a critical
question in need of further research is how respondents
determine the intentions of a decision-maker. We recom-
mend that further work on intentions should borrow from
the work of Malle and his colleagues (Malle, 1999; Malle
& Knobe, 1997; Malle, Knobe, O’Laughlin, Pearce, &
Nelson, 2000). Malle et al. (2000) argued that respondents
use ‘‘folk explanations’’ in trying to understand why people
act the way they do. Malle et al. indicated that respondents
may use either ‘‘representational mental states’’ (i.e.,
desires, values, attitudes, or beliefs) or ‘‘causal history
reason’’ (i.e., a factor that is outside of the actor’s
awareness) to account for people’s behavior. Representa-
tional mental states refer to conscious beliefs that a person
has, which in turn directly affect behavior. Intentional
behavior is explained by representational mental states.
Causal history reasons refer to ‘‘factors that lay in the
causal historyy but are not themselves reasons [that drive
performance].’’ Causal history reasons are often in the form
of dispositions or personality traits and are generally used
to explain unintentional behavior. In the present context,
an example of a representational mental state explanation
might be that the hiring manager believes that women are
not suited for the kinds of jobs available in his department
(i.e., a belief) and therefore he hires Bob rather than Mary.
An example of a causal history reason explanation might
be that the hiring manager appears uncomfortable with
women (i.e., a disposition), and therefore he hires Bob
rather than Mary. The former explanation suggests greater
intentionality than the latter explanation, and therefore
may lead respondents to ascribing greater perceived
discrimination in the former situation compared to the
latter situation.
In addition to representational mental states and causal
history reasons, Malle et al. (2000) introduced the notion
of enabling factors that allow the behavior to occur. In
otherwords, people use enabling factors to explain how the
actor’s intention translated into behavior. In the present
context, the absence of an effective human resource
department might be seen as an enabling factor.
The importance of enabling factors is expected to vary,
depending on other considerations (Malle et al., 2000).
Enabling factors are more frequently mentioned when the
behavior is difficult than when it is easy. In a company
under a court-ordered affirmative action program to hire
women, for instance, a manager who fails to hire a highly
qualified woman might be viewed as having exhibited a
‘‘difficult’’ behavior and therefore the focus would turn to
what enabling factors made that behavior possible.
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Enabling factors are more often the focus when the
underlying reasons for the behavior are well understood.
Conversely, enabling factors are less likely to be considered
when the intentions are not well understood. For example,
perhaps a manager who previously had shown himself to
be very supportive of promoting women was found to have
rejected an apparently qualified woman for promotion.
Because the manager’s behavior would not be well under-
stood, respondents are likely to focus more on under-
standing his intention for this surprising decision.
Alternatively, if this manager had a history of not hiring
women, the focus is likely to be more on the enabling
factors that allowed the manager to reject her (e.g., on the
human resource department’s failure to monitor the
situation).
At least two additional variables should be considered in
this context. One variable concerns the nature of the prior
interactions between the rejected candidate and the
decision-maker (Ilgen & Favero, 1985) or organization.
Indeed, in a promotion decision situation, there may be a
long history of interactions between the manager making
the promotion decision and the rejected candidate. To the
degree to which these interactions were positive and
cordial, we would expect that the candidate would be less
likely to assume any discriminatory intention by the
decision-maker. Thus, previous interactions should be
considered in understanding perceptions of intention. In
the absence of a specific known decision-maker, where the
rejected candidate may rely more on perceptions of the
organization’s reputation for diversity/discrimination, in-
tentionality may be influenced by other interactions
between the rejected candidate and the organization, or
by information provided by the rejected candidate’s friends
and family members regarding the organization.
Second, greater attention must be paid to the nature of
the explanation for a rejection. Kappen and Branscombe
(2001), for instance, examined the effects of four different
gender-related reasons for preventing subjects from attend-
ing an event. In the first condition, subjects were merely
told that their gender was the reason. In the second
condition, subjects were told that they were too small (for
women) or too large (for men). Subjects in the third
condition were told that they were too small (for women)
or too large (for men) andwere given a logical explanation
for the relevance of size. Finally, in the fourth condition, no
reason was given for the rejection. Subjects in the first
condition were significantly more likely to attribute the
decision to discrimination than subjects in the second or
third conditions. Interestingly, subjects in the fourth
condition (no explanation) were more likely to attribute
the decision to discrimination than subjects in the second or
third condition. It seems reasonable to expect, then,
that the reason provided to the candidate may deter-
mine whether the behavior was believed to be intentional
and therefore the degree to which discrimination has
occurred.
Individual Differences
An important variable in understanding perceptions of
discrimination may be subgroup identity. Specifically, we
propose that people who more strongly identify with a
particular subgroup which has historically experienced
discrimination will be more likely to perceive discrimina-
tion in a selection or promotion context than those who do
not identify with the group (Johnson & Lecci, 2003; King,
2003; Kobrynowicz & Branscombe, 1997; Operario &
Fiske, 2001). Operario and Fiske, for instance, found that
respondents who were high on ethnic identity reported
experiencing significantly more discrimination than re-
spondents who were low on ethnic identity. This effect was
only found for minority subjects; ethnic identity did not
affect Whites, for whom ethnic identity may not be a
meaningful categorization. In a second study, using only
minority (Asian, Black, and Latino) subjects, Operario and
Fiske (2001) manipulated the behavior of a partner in an
experimental setting and reported that ratings of discrimi-
nation were highest for those subjects who identified most
with their ethnic group.
Despite a consistent set of studies indicating the
importance of subgroup identity on perceptions of
discrimination, there has been little research and theorizing
as to why this effect occurs. One explanation has focused
on increased sensitization, whereby individuals who highly
identify with a subgroup are more sensitive to inequalities
and therefore are more likely to attribute bad outcomes to
discrimination (Sellers & Shelton, 2003).
A second individual differences variable that can
influence perceptions of employment discrimination is
mood. Research has shown that mood plays an important
role in judgments and decisions of all kinds (Schwarz, Bless,
& Bohner, 1991). Mood may serve as a piece of
information in judging an event or situation. Tying this
literature to perceptions of discrimination, Sechrist, Swim,
andMark (2003) examined the effect of mood on ratings of
discrimination. They reported that women who were
induced to have a negative mood perceived more dis-
crimination than women in a positive mood. Moreover,
when reading scenarios describing potential discrimina-
tion, subjects in a negative mood were more likely to
perceive discrimination to have occurred. These effects,
however, were tempered by whether or not an external
attribution for their mood was made. Sechrist et al.
manipulated this factor by informing half of the subjects
that their current mood may have been affected by the
previous questionnaires that they completed. Indeed, for
the subjects who were told this, mood had little or no effect
on their ratings of discrimination.
This research indicates that mood may play a role in
perceptions of employment discrimination. A closely
related question is whether mood also has an indirect
effect on perceived discrimination, through the other
antecedents in the prototype model. For instance, does
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mood affect the perceived intentionality of the decision-
maker’s behavior or actions?We recommend that research-




In the last ten or fifteen years, research on applicant
reactions to selection processes has produced a large body
of literature (Ryan & Ployhart, 2000). Developing largely
from a growing interest in procedural fairness (Greenberg,
1986, 1987), Gilliland’s (1993) theoretical model and
empirical test (Gilliland, 1994) provoked substantial
interest in this area. Most recently, an empirical measure
for many of its key variables (Bauer et al., 2001), as well as
other developments, have continued a flurry of activity in
this area. Despite the plethora of research on candidate
reactions to selection processes in terms of fairness, there is
an almost complete absence of literature on candidate
perceptions of discrimination in selection processes.
Although some might argue that perceptions of justice
and perceptions of discrimination are often synonymous,
we do not think this is the case. As explained earlier, a
decision may be perceived as unfair for a variety of reasons.
Consistent with Goldman (2001), we consider justice
perceptions to be an important predictor of perceptions
of discrimination and legal claiming behavior.
In this section, we describe the organizational justice
model in greater detail. Specifically, we review the
distributive and procedural justice factors that determine
perceptions of employment discrimination. In addition, we
apply relatively recent developments in the justice literature
in social psychology about how justice judgments are
formed (i.e., how people combine information about
procedural and distributive justice into an overall fairness
judgment) to the area of perceived discrimination. Figure 2
gives an overview of the factors in the organizational justice
model.
Distributive Fairness
Much of the early organizational justice literature has
focused on distributive justice, which is concerned with the
fairness of organizational outcomes (Folger & Cropanza-
no, 1998; Greenberg, 1987). Although this concept seems
to have high relevance for perceived discrimination in
selection and promotion, this has been examined empiri-
cally in only a handful of studies. As noted above, Goldman
(2001) reported that distributive justice was negatively
related to terminated employees’ filing of an employment
discrimination claim.
More specifically, the distributive justice perspective
suggests that the content of the actual selection or
promotion decision plays a key role in the perception of
discrimination. We would therefore expect that rejected
candidates are more likely to perceive that discrimination
has occurred in the selection or promotion process than
accepted candidates, all else being equal. However, it is also
very important to consider the expectations that people
have regarding their performance (Gilliland, 1993, 1994).
Do applicants receive the hiring decision they feel they
deserve? Perception of discrimination would be more likely
when performance expectations are not met than when
they are met.
In the development of performance expectations, three
distributive rules can be applied: equity, equality, and need.
Although the fairness of outcomes is generally determined
on the basis of equity, sometimes the other rules can become
more salient, especially in the context of discrimination
(Colquitt, Conlon, Wesson, Porter, & Ng, 2001; Gilliland,
1993). According to equity theory, distributions are con-
sidered fair when the ratio of a candidate’s inputs (such as
qualifications and ability) and outcomes (such as invitation



















Figure 2. The organizational justice model of perceived employment discrimination.
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comparison with another person or with oneself in previous
selection or promotion situations (Greenberg, 1987).
In contrast, the equality rule states that all applicants
should have an equal chance of receiving a positive
outcome, regardless of their own inputs and characteristics.
If candidates get a negative selection decision based on their
race or gender, this rule is violated. This shows that the
equality rule, especially its violation, seems to play a central
role in the perception of discrimination. Along these lines,
Gilliland (1993) proposed that equality will have a greater
impact on overall outcome fairness for those individuals
who have had prior exposure to discrimination and those
who belong to frequently against groups than for others.
Finally, the needs rule claims that outcomes should be
distributed on the basis of individual (special) needs. From
this perspective, certain minority groups should receive
preferential treatment. Again, this rule can be particularly
important in a discrimination context. For instance, the needs
rule can be used to justify certain affirmative action programs.
From the above discussion, it follows that respecting one
distributive rule can lead to the violation of others. For
example, if you grant certain disadvantaged groups a
special treatment, the equality rule is obviously violated.
Which rule is more salient for candidates in the evaluation
of distributive justice is determined by a host of individual
(e.g., personal characteristics, previous experiences, sub-
group identity) and situational (e.g., test or interview type,
personal characteristics of interviewer) factors.
Procedural Fairness
Another important component of organizational justice is
procedural justice which incorporates the fairness of the
process or procedures used to determine organizational
outcomes (Folger&Cropanzano, 1998; Greenberg, 1987).
Although there is a lack of research linking procedural
fairness to perceived discrimination in a selection or
promotion context, previous studies have already demon-
strated that procedural fairness is negatively related to
terminated employees’ wrongful termination or discrimi-
nation claiming (Goldman, 2001; Lind et al., 2000).
Gilliland (1993, 1995) applied the procedural justice
perspective to personnel selection systems and identified a
number of rules that candidates can rely on in their
evaluation of procedural fairness. Again, which rule is
more salient depends on many individual (e.g., personal
characteristics, previous experiences) and situational in-
fluences (e.g., type of selection procedure, extent of rule
violation, stage in selection process). Gilliland’s rules are
grouped into three components that correspond to the non-
distributive forms of justice proposed by Colquitt et al.
(2001): formal characteristics or procedural justice in a
strict sense, explanation or informational justice, and
interpersonal treatment or interpersonal justice. The last
two categories together are sometimes referred to as
interactional justice (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998).
An essential element of procedural justice in a strict
sense is ‘‘voice’’ or the control that people can exert over the
decision process (Colquitt et al., 2001; Greenberg, 1987).
In order to be judged fair, a selection procedure should not
only offer voice opportunity, but also be job-related,
consistent, accurate, and unbiased. If these conditions are
met, it is likely that the perception of discrimination among
candidates for selection or promotion will be lower.
Informational justice suggests that candidates should
receive honest and timely explanations about the proce-
dures and decisions, as well as feedback about their own
performance (Colquitt et al., 2001; Gilliland, 1993). These
principles offer important insights about how the percep-
tion of discrimination could possibly be alleviated. Suppose
that a gay candidate did not hear anything from the
company that interviewed him. This leaves a lot of room
for subjective interpretation and might lead him to
conclude he was not selected on the basis of his sexual
orientation. If, on the other hand, the company called him
back soon after the interview and explainedwhy hewas not
selected, the same conclusion would be less likely.
Perhaps the most important component in the context of
perceived discrimination is interpersonal justice. It seems
logical that when candidates from aminority group are not
treated with politeness, dignity, warmth, and respect, they
will be much more likely to feel discriminated against than
when they are. Moreover, according to Gilliland (1993),
fair interpersonal treatment also involves the absence of
improper questions and prejudicial statements. Again,
there appears to be a link to perceived discrimination
(Gilliland, 1995). For instance, if a woman is asked about
her being pregnant during the employment interview (even
though it is illegal), she would probably feel discriminated
against because of her gender.
Fairness Heuristic
Whereas the previous two sections dealt with procedural
fairness and distributive fairness separately, an important
question is how people combine procedural and distribu-
tive fairness information to form overall fairness judg-
ments. In their review, Brockner and Wiesenfeld (1996)
concluded that these interactive effects can be described in
three ways. A first relatively robust pattern is that when
outcomes are seen as unfair, procedural fairness percep-
tions have a more direct influence on people’s reactions
than when outcomes are perceived to be fair. In addition,
when procedural fairness is low, distributive fairness is
more likely to be positively related to individuals’ reactions
than when procedural fairness is high. Finally, low
procedural fairness and low distributive fairness yield the
most negative reactions.
On the basis of recent research in the justice literature
(e.g., Brockner, 2002; Brockner &Wiesenfeld, 1996; Lind,
2001; Van den Bos, 2001; Van den Bos, Lind, & Wilke,
2001), we propose fairness heuristic theory to explain
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possible interactive effects between procedural and dis-
tributive fairness in the context of discrimination. One of
the central contributions of fairness heuristic theory is its
focus on the cognitive processes underlying fairness
reactions. In particular, it posits that people start looking
for fairness-relevant information to cope with concerns of
uncertainty or lack of trust. Examples in the context of
discrimination are that we do not trust people who are on a
selection board, that we do not know the final selection
decision, and so forth. Moreover, fairness heuristic theory
posits that people do not engage in a full exploration of
fairness information. Instead, they quickly construct a
fairness heuristic that they use to guide their reactions to
future actions and decisions. This fairness heuristic is
defined as a ‘‘psychological shortcut used to decidewhether
to accept or reject the directives of people in positions of
authority’’ (Lind, Kulik, Ambrose, & de Vera Park, 1993,
p. 225; see also Tyler & Lind, 1992).
The next question then becomes which type of fairness
information (procedural, informational, interpersonal, dis-
tributive) people use as a cognitive shortcut to form overall
fairness judgments. Research from a fairness heuristic
perspective has shown that the availability (interpretability)
and order (timing) of the information provided serve as
drivers of the fairness heuristic and, therefore, have major
effects on how procedural and distributive fairness are
integrated in overall fairness judgments.
With regard to the availability of the information
provided, Van den Bos, Lind, Vermunt, and Wilke (1997)
argued that when comparison information about outcomes
of others is not available, people will start using other
information that is more readily available. In other words,
they will use the latter information as a substitute for
information that would be most directly relevant but that is
actually missing. In particular, Van den Bos et al. (1997)
proposed that in many situations people may turn to the
fairness of the procedure to assess how to react to their
outcome because such procedural information is usually
available. Several laboratory studies confirmed their
propositions. When participants were not given informa-
tion about the outcome of a socially relevant other
(socially-based comparison information), they relied more
upon procedural information (i.e., whether they had the
opportunity to voice) as a kind of heuristic substitute to
form their outcome fairness judgments. Van den Bos,
Wilke, Lind, and Vermunt (1998) found the same results
(i.e., participants switched to procedural information as a
basis for making fairness judgments) when people had only
expectations about their outcome relative to others as
opposed towhen they actually knew the outcome of others.
These findings are particularly relevant in the context of
employment discrimination. In particular, when candidates
are applying for a job opening, they are unlikely to find out
who was hired or only have vague expectations about who
was hired. Since they lack this important information
about the selection outcome of others, fairness heuristic
theory posits that people will tend to focus on less relevant
but more available procedural fairness information in their
evaluation of discrimination. Conversely, candidates for a
promotional opportunity will typically find out who was
promoted. In this situation, fairness heuristic theory states
that candidates will directly focus on the outcome
information of others (distributive fairness) in their
determination of discrimination instead of using a fairness
heuristic.
Apart from the availability of information, the order
(timing) of the information provided is another driver of
the fairness heuristic. Specifically, Van den Bos, Vermunt,
andWilke (1997) found that ‘‘what is fair depends more on
what comes first than on what comes next’’ (p. 95). In
particular, procedural fairness had stronger effects on
outcome judgments when people were informed about
procedures before they were informed about outcomes,
whereas distributive fairness was more important in
individuals’ judgments when they were informed about
outcomes before they were informed about procedures.
This primacy effect is also relevant in the context of
discrimination. It demonstrates that early information will
set the stage for the interpretation of later fairness
information. Usually, candidates have had time to experi-
ence and consider the procedural elements of a given
selection situation (e.g., the hiring manager was friendly)
prior to receiving a selection decision. However, it is also
possible that after receiving the selection decision, candi-
dates hear that some procedural violations occurred (e.g.,
some test results were discounted). The same is true in legal
cases about discrimination. Again, procedural information
about the way the court case is conducted is typically
known prior to the verdict. Yet, in some cases, peoplemight
be informed afterwards that crucial procedural mistakes
were made. According to fairness heuristics theory, the
relative importance of procedural and distributive fairness
will depend on the timing and availability of this
information. Other research about fairness heuristic theory
(Lind, Kray,&Thompson, 2001; Van den Bos, Vermunt,&
Wilke, 1996) expanded the order effect findings by
demonstrating that the same primacy effects also occur
within a specific type of fairness information. For instance,
Lind et al. (2001) demonstrated that early procedural
information had a greater effect than subsequent procedur-
al information, indicating that information presented
earlier typically drives the fairness heuristic.
Applied to a discrimination context, these findings lead
to a better understanding of the relative effects of the
provision of different types of procedural information in
the selection process. Generally, two forms of selection
information are distinguished. First, information (about
the job-relatedness of the selection procedures, about the
scoring system, and about the purposes forwhich the scores
will be used) might be provided to applicants prior to the
selection process (Arvey & Sackett, 1993). Sitkin and Bies
(1993) referred to this kind of information as anticipatory
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explanations. Second, selection information also applies to
the provision of information after the selection process.
This form of selection information refers to the provision of
an explanation or a justification for specific selection
decisions, which have already been taken (Bies & Shapiro,
1988; Gilliland, 1993; Greenberg, 1990). According to
fairness heuristic theory, the provision of pre-test informa-
tion might have more impact on fairness reactions because
this information is provided in an early phase. In addition,
it might provide people with a better understanding of
selection procedures, reducing uncertainty (see also Arvey
& Sackett, 1993). This might be especially true for
selection procedures, which applicants typically view as
relatively unattractive (e.g., cognitive ability tests) or
invasive (e.g., personality inventories) (Gilliland, 1993).
Although some recent studies have examined the effects of
pre-test information (Lievens, De Corte, & Bryse, 2003;
Truxillo, Bauer, Campion, & Paronto, 2002) and explana-
tions (Horvath, Ryan, & Stierwalt, 2000; Ployhart, Ryan,
& Bennett, 1999) on fairness judgments, no research has
explicitly used fairness heuristic theory as a conceptual
framework to test these propositions in personnel selection
in general or discrimination in particular.
Consequences of Perceived Discrimination
Although a detailed discussion of the outcomes of
perceptions of discrimination is beyond the scope of this
paper, we offer some suggestions in this regard. We suspect
that there are at least three types of reactions to perceived
discrimination: reduced psychological well-being, in-
creased likelihood of taking legal action, and negative job
attitudes and behaviors.
There have been several studies in the social psycholo-
gical literature addressing the effects of perceived discri-
mination on psychological well-being. Of particular
interest is the finding that perceived discrimination may
have different effects for minority and majority groups.
Schmitt, Branscombe, Kobrynowicz, and Owen (2002)
reported that for women, experiencing more perceived
discrimination lowered their psychological well-being. At
the same time, experiencing more perceived discrimination
increased in-group identification for women, which in turn
improved their psychological well-being. Thus, although
there was a direct negative effect on well-being, perceived
discrimination also had a positive, albeit indirect, effect on
well-being. For men, however, Schmitt et al. reported that
perceived discrimination had no effect on psychological
well-being, neither directly, nor indirectly through in-group
identification. Other studies looking at gender differences
in the consequences of perceived discrimination have failed
to report significant findings (e.g., Swim, Hyers, Cohen, &
Ferguson, 2001). Such findings suggest that much more
research is needed regarding the effects of perceived
workplace discrimination on psychological well-being.
Second, taking legal action or filing a discrimination
charge with the appropriate state or federal agency would
seem like a natural consequence of perceived discrimina-
tion. Yet, at least in the area of sexual harassment, it is
widely believed that many employees who experience
discrimination do not take any legal action (Magley, Hulin,
Fitzgerald, & DeNardo, 1999). Kowalski’s (1996) frame-
work of complaining behavior provides a number of
possible explanations for applicant and employee reluc-
tance to take legal action. Very briefly, her model assumes
that people will engage in complaining behavior when the
perceived value of complaining outweighs the perceived
value of not complaining. Kowalski offers a plethora of
variables thatmay affect the likelihood of one complaining,
including extraversion, age, and gender. Kowalski also
hypothesized that self-presentation concerns will affect the
likelihood of complaining, such that individuals who are
highly fearful of negative evaluation or in high need of
approval from others may be less likely to complain.
Therefore, while increased probability of taking legal
action is a likely outcome of perceived discrimination,
there is a need to include other variables as predictors as
well.
Finally, perceived discrimination is likely to affect other
important I/O psychology variables of interest, such as
turnover, organizational commitment, and citizenship
behavior. Whether these consequences are as true for
majority group members as they are for minority group
members should be addressed with empirical studies.
We turn now to a brief discussion where we compare
and contrast our two models and offer some suggestions as
to when a respondent may use one model rather than the
other model.
Discussion
In spite of the importance of perceived discrimination in
selection and promotion processes, there is a lack of
conceptual models in this area. To stimulate and guide
research we proposed two theoretical models from other
well-founded domains to help explain candidates’ like-
lihood of perceiving that discrimination has occurred.
Relevant variables from these frameworks were identified
as possible antecedents of perceived employment discrimi-
nation.
There are two ways to understand our models. One
approach is to view them as complementary, rather than
opposing models. In that way, they could be integrated to
form one large model. Essentially, the prototype and
organizational justice model try to explain the same
phenomenon, but from a fundamentally different perspec-
tive. The prototype model stems from social psychology
and focuses on the actors and in particular the perceived
intention of the decision-maker. The organizational justice
model focuses more on fairness considerations, such as
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how fair the process was, as well as the outcomes of other
candidates.
However, both models share certain similarities. For
instance, the extent to which the interaction between a job
candidate and a company interviewer is friendly and
respectful may be important in both models. According
to the prototype model, this has a major influence on the
perceived intention of the interviewer which subsequently
determines perceived discrimination. In the organizational
justice model, this interaction is a key component of
interpersonal fairness which in turn can be a determinant of
perceived employment discrimination. Likewise, both
models recognize the importance of the explanation for
selection and promotion decisions that is provided to the
candidates as a crucial antecedent of perceived discrimina-
tion. Moreover, we would not be surprised if the individual
difference variables (i.e., subgroup identification and
mood) had important effects on the justice model variables
as well as on the prototype model variables. Thus, it seems
reasonable that there will be overlap between these models.
It is also possible that these are two opposing models.
However, rather than pitting one model against the other
and attempting to determine which is the ‘‘right’’ model
andwhich is the ‘‘wrong’’ model, it is quite conceivable that
sometimes a respondent will use one model and sometimes
a respondent will use the other model. Thus, there may be
factors that determine whether an individual uses the
prototype model or the organizational justice model in
assessing whether discrimination has occurred. Dual-
process models, which assume that people use quite
different information-processing procedures depending
on various circumstances, are common in social psychol-
ogy (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999). In this light, we offer
three factors that may affect whether one uses the
prototype or organizational justice model.
Missing Information
Our models assume that different information is used by
the respondent. For example, the organizational justice
model assumes that information about the process (e.g.,
procedures used) and outcomes (e.g., other candidates’
outcomes) is available. In some selection or promotion
contexts, the employee or applicant is likely to have little or
no information whatsoever about the processes used or the
outcomes of other candidates. In that situation, the
employee or applicant may use the prototype model to
judge whether discrimination occurred. Alternatively, in
organizations where promotion systems are highly pub-
licized, and where it is known which candidates were
promoted and which were not, candidates who were not
promoted may have a substantial amount of information
regarding the processes used and the other candidates
promoted and not promoted. In that case, the candidate
may use the organizational justice model in determining
whether discrimination occurred.
Subgroup Identity
We predict that the respondent’s subgroup identity may
determine which model is used. Candidates who have a
strong subgroup identity are more likely to view ambig-
uous situations as discriminatory and therefore may be
more suspicious of any process that is used. Theymay focus
more on aspects such as who the decision-maker was.
Unfortunately, there is only a limited literature comparing
perceptions of different subgroups with regard to selection
and promotion procedures and most of this work is limited
to psychological tests (e.g., Chan, 1997). Most impor-
tantly, however, it is the person’s subgroup identity, and
not his or her actual race or gender, which seems most
important.
Which Distributive Rule Is Used?
As described earlier, different candidates may subscribe to
different distributive rules. While the equity rule empha-
sizes distributive fairness, the equality rule emphasizes that
all applicants should have an equal chance of a positive
outcome, regardless of their inputs and characteristics,
while the needs rule emphasizes that outcomes should be
based on needs. It seems reasonable to expect that
individuals embracing the latter two rules would be more
likely to apply a prototype model than the organizational
justice model.
Conclusions
Although we focused on selection and promotion deci-
sions, we submit that these models could serve as a basis for
research about perceived discrimination in any number of
employment situations, such as performance evaluation,
reward management, leader-subordinate interactions, and
so forth. Moreover, their usefulness is not limited to the
domain of race discrimination. Instead, the perceived
discrimination explained by the models can be based on
any personal characteristic, such as gender, religion, sexual
orientation, health, and so forth. It should also be observed
that our models have been primarily studied in the U.S. and
to a lesser degree, in Western Europe. Nonetheless, we
believe that they are also applicable to similar issues in
other countries and cultures. We recommend that research
be done to examine their cross-cultural generalizability.
It should also be recognized that there may be other
theoretical frameworks (e.g., attribution theory; Major,
Kaiser, & McCoy, 2003) that will apply to the issue of
perceived discrimination. We encourage researchers to
consider other possible models and to conduct empirical
investigations to determine which is the best in this case.
In sum, the present contribution is unique in that
perceived discrimination has not yet been introduced to the
I/O psychology. We also offer two different models of the
antecedents of this construct, which nevertheless share
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some common features. Finally, we have introduced some
refinements to these models, which should add to their
value in understanding perceived discrimination.
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